UK citizens will feel economic pain of Russia sanctions

Economic costs of sanctions against Russia
Economic costs of sanctions against Russia

By RT

UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss warned on Tuesday that the British people will suffer “economic costs” of sanctions against Russia, as electricity bills and the cost of living increase due to the West’s response to the conflict in Ukraine.

“Of course, there will be an economic cost for British people from these sanctions, in terms of their energy bills and their cost of living, but that cost is nothing compared to the cost to the people of Ukraine of this horrific barbarism they’re facing,” Truss told the UK parliament.

Despite the impact on Britain, Truss defended the UK’s response, claiming that it was necessary as there is “no limit” to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “ambitions” if he does not fail in Ukraine.

The UK has, so far, introduced sanctions against several Russian banks, including Sberbank, VEB and Sovcombank, as well as against specific individuals, including businessmen Gennady Timchenko, Boris Rotenberg, and Igor Botenberg.

The statement from Truss came after she admitted on Monday that the UK had been “slower” to respond to Russia’s military activity in Ukraine than the EU and US, blaming the House of Lords for delaying government action.

Citing amendments made by Lords to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018, Truss claimed it was “harder to get sanctions agreed,” describing the current process as “cumbersome and slower” than before.

Despite this, the House of Commons fast-tracked the economic crime bill on Monday, which the government claims will allow it to target individuals linked to Putin “harder and faster” with sanctions. The bill is awaiting consideration by the House of Lords but Truss hopes it will be passed into law by March 14.

Source: RT News

Russia, Solzhenitsyn, and the Reset Button

In 2009, Hillary Clinton, then U.S. Secretary of State, presented her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, with a “reset” button she thought symbolized a new era for Russian and American diplomacy.

Lavrov pointed out the word the Americans had chosen, “peregruzka,” meant “overcharged,” not “reset.” Though the two leaders laughed off the mistake, the mistranslated button was a symbol of persistent misunderstanding between the two nations.

Russia has long been characterized by many in the West as enigmatic; indeed, almost beyond understanding. It was Winston Churchill who in October of 1939, mere weeks after the invasion of Poland by Nazi armed forces, speculated on the role of Russia in the war, famously depicting Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

He added: “…but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest of the safety of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia.”

In other words, Churchill could not envision the dismemberment of the Soviet Union by the German war machine without Russia fighting for her “life interests.” History proved him right. Russia survived, though gravely wounded.

The claims of Russia to her unique, historic life interests again came to the forefront when the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s and Russia the nation and empire appeared on the verge of total disintegration. Russia found itself in desperate need of a Weltanschauung that would replace the communist ideology that had held the nation in its grip for seventy years. If she did not, she might even face the prospect of radical shrinkage back to the proportions of Kievan Rus, her empire absorbed into Eastern Europe and the Far East. For some, if not most, of Russia’s political and intellectual leaders, the prospect of seeing the Russian empire virtually disappear was unthinkable.

Discerning that a U.S. Marshall Plan was not in order for Russia, several main figures came forward with ideas for a Russian reset button, one which they saw as including the “historic life interests” of Russia in the post-communist era. One, of course, is Vladimir Putin, whose embrace of Russian Orthodoxy has been a reason for the elevation of Christianity to a place of influence it occupied for over a millennium.

One of the spiritual and philosophical influences behind Putin has been Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Partly due to Putin’s influence, Solzhenitsyn’s master work The Gulag Archipelago is now required reading in Russian schools.

Solzhenitsyn openly rejected the secularist and leftist liberal political philosophy dominating the cultures of Europe and America. Russia, he said, had her own unique spiritual and historic heritage, a heritage that clashed with the dominant ideology of the West. Though he admired the spirituality of the American heartland, he saw the West in general as drowning in a vortex created by moral degradation, anti-religious sentiment, and extreme individualism.

Perhaps the most succinct and prescient analyses of the errors of the liberal democratic West and the failure of the West to understand Russia and Russian spirituality is found in his speech at Harvard University, given in 1978 some eleven years before the collapse of East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Solzhenitsyn reminded the Harvard graduates that the West was not the one and only advanced culture. Russia also deserved high regard as an ancient and autonomous entity:
Any ancient and deeply rooted, autonomous culture… constitutes an autonomous world, full of riddles and surprises to Western thinking… For one thousand years Russia belonged to such a category, although Western thinking systematically committed the mistake of denying its autonomous character and therefore never understood it…”

In other words, if Russia was an enigma, it was due to Western blindness, a blindness that was largely due to spiritual cataracts. If Russia seemed inscrutable, it was because American and the rest of the West failed to understand the Russian soul and the Russian nation. No reset was possible unless the West returned to its own Christian spiritual roots. Until spiritual eyeglasses provided vision, the materialistic but powerful West would remain blinded by its sense of total superiority.

The West, he went on to say, thought of itself as possessing the most attractive system, and regarded other nations as culturally inferior entities that needed to come up to speed, rejecting their “wicked governments” and “their own barbarity” in order to take “the way of western pluralistic democracy and adopting the Western way of life. Countries are judged on the merit of their progress in this direction. However, it is a conception which develops out of Western incomprehension of the essence of other worlds, out of the mistake of measuring them all with a Western yardstick.”

Russia had its own ancient and autonomous character and was in some ways more advanced than the secularist West, which he saw as declining in courage, and as inclined toward overemphasis on individual rights seldom ameliorated by a corresponding emphasis on individual obligations. Such was the emphasis on individual rights that “destructive and irresponsible freedom has been granted boundless space.” The result was that evil had boundless freedom to expand in every part of society, expressing itself as individual “rights,” be those rights exhibiting themselves in pornography, violence, and even anarchy. A firm belief in the basic goodness of human nature coupled with an almost complete misapprehension of the evil inherent in human nature had led the West to embracing what amounted to spiritual and moral anarchy.

The spiritual condition of the West meant its system was not the ideal model for Russia, which Solzhenitsyn characterized as possessing spiritual strength the West had once possessed, but which it had rejected. The West was spiritually exhausted due to the repudiation of the Christian principles on which it was based. As Russia was, even in the midst of the communist regime, gaining her spiritual strength, a vitiated West had virtually nothing to say to her beyond advocacy of runaway materialism and out-of-control individualism.

Solzhenitsyn went on to point out the basic error that led to the decadence of the West; namely, the assumption of the Enlightenment that mankind has no higher force above him, but is autonomous — mankind as the center of everything that exists. In effect, the West, including America, which at its inception believed quite differently, rejected the idea that all “individual human rights were granted because man is God’s creature.” Freedom, he said, is conditional in that it has grave religious responsibilities, an idea that had roots thousands of years old.

He concluded any commonality between Russia and the West had to be spiritual:
“[If] the world has not come to its end, it has approached a major turn in history, equal in importance to the turn from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. It will exact from us a spiritual upsurge: We shall have to rise to a new height of vision, to a new level of life where our physical nature will not be cursed as in the Middle Ages, but, even more importantly, our spiritual being will not be trampled upon as in the Modern era. This ascension will be similar to climbing onto the next anthropologic stage. No one on earth has any other way left but — upward.”

For Solzhenitsyn, Christianity, specifically the Russian Orthodox Church, had informed the Russian soul and Russia since the end of the first millennium, with roots going back to the Eastern Roman Empire. The path leading to restoration of true greatness lay in a return to God and a repudiation of the dark inheritance of a so-called Enlightenment that fostered atheism and sought to tear down Christianity.

Having experienced firsthand the brutality of a regime motivated by atheism, Solzhenitsyn saw a similar deleterious influence at the core of the crisis of the West. Once again, runaway atheism was revealing its inherently destructive nature. In his Templeton Prize Lecture of May 1983, “Godlessness: The First Step to the Gulag,” he said:

“And if I were called upon to identify briefly the principal trait of the entire twentieth century, here too, I would be unable to find anything more precise and pithy than to repeat once again: Men have forgotten God. The failings of human consciousness, deprived of its divine dimension, have been a determining factor in all the major crimes of this century.
“…the world had never before known a godlessness as organized, militarized, and tenaciously malevolent as that practiced by Marxism. Within the philosophical system of Marx and Lenin, and at the heart of their psychology, hatred of God is the principal driving force, more fundamental than all their political and economic pretensions. Militant atheism is not merely incidental or marginal to Communist policy; it is not a side effect, but the central pivot.
[In the West] …the concepts of good and evil have been ridiculed for several centuries; banished from common use, they have been replaced by political or class considerations of short lived value. It has become embarrassing to state that evil makes its home in the individual human heart before it enters a political system.”

The West, including America, was sliding toward an abyss of its own making. The young were deliberately being taught godlessness and hatred of their own society. The subsequent corrosion of the human heart and hatred was fast becoming the signature of the contemporary free world, which appeared anxious to export to the rest of the world its own philosophy of godlessness and immorality.

The solution, he concluded, was repentance and return to God:
“…[W]e can propose only a determined quest for the warm hand of God, which we have so rashly and self-confidently spurned. Only in this way can our eyes be opened to the errors of this unfortunate twentieth century and our bands be directed to setting them right. There is nothing else to cling to in the landslide: the combined vision of all the thinkers of the Enlightenment amounts to nothing… If we perish and lose this world, the fault will be ours alone.”

Solzhenitsyn’s powerful insights hold much truth. If there is to be a reset between the West and Russia, it must be based on the mutual and ancient Christian roots of both entities. Here in the United States, there is a Christian commonality that still exists, but it desperately requires fostering and revival.

In the meantime, Christianity in the West and in Russia remains a key to the relationship between the two.
Therein lies a way to rapprochement.
Therein lies a possibility of a “reset button.”
The way will not be easy, as the present leaders of the West have largely bowed to the forces of a spiritually arid and atheistic secularism.
But there is hope that some will seek to hear and to heed the voice that says, “This is the way. Walk in it.”

Fay Voshell is a frequent contributor to American Thinker. She holds a M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary, where she received the seminary’s prize for excellence in systematic theology. Her thoughts have appeared in many online magazines, including Russia Insider, National Review, CNS, RealClearReligion and Fox News. She has also presented her views on radio and television. She may be reached at fvoshell@yahoo.com.

Author: Fay Voshell
Source: American Thinker
 

Russia unfairly demonized

In Cold War days Moscow probably deserved all the demonization it got. Domestic repression was severe. The military were out of control; the number they killed in Afghanistan could well have rivaled the U.S. in Vietnam.

Their security people were also on a rampage. The two years I once spent in Moscow trying to learn the language and know the people ended up as little more than an invitation for the hard-eyed men in the KGB to constantly harass me and persecute anyone who tried to help me. And that was during the so-called Khrushchev liberalization period of the early 1960s.

But there were also times when Moscow deserved some understanding. Even in Afghanistan it did at least try to create something more progressive than the mess we see today. At home there was a genuine willingness to allow non-Russian peoples to keep their culture and languages. The “evil empire” of U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s imagination was not quite as evil as it was made out; it was at least able to throw up a leader of Mikhail Gorbachev’s quality. Meanwhile the best our allegedly superior democratic West could do was, well, Reagan.

Today it is clear the demonization goes much too far. The post-1991 efforts to reach out to the West were remarkable to anyone who knew what went before. Vladimir Putin with his KGB background is no Gorbachev. But the invitation to join the Group of Seven industrialized nations meant much for the Russians. Finally Russia had the acceptance as a Western-oriented nation it had always wanted.

Today all that has been thrown away by the meaningless effort to demonize Moscow over the Ukraine civil war and Crimea. From the beginning Putin had made it clear Russia was not seeking territory, that it was only supporting the moves for autonomy by the Russian-speaking peoples in the eastern Ukrainian provinces — moves sparked by the inefficiency and then breakdown of the central government in Kiev, and by the foolish attempt to ban the use of Russian. Putin rejected his critics who said Moscow should annex those historically Russian territories. His move would also be justified by the recent Western concept of R2P — the responsibility to protect peoples being suppressed by superior central government force.

Yet for some strange reason this move was made out to be Russian aggression and a denial of Ukrainian sovereignty. The aggression claim continues despite acceptance by all sides of the Minsk agreement of February this year, where Ukraine and Russia agreed on a cease-fire and “local self-governance in particular in the districts of Donetsk and Luhansk.” Ukrainian sovereignty and some administration rights were specifically endorsed. What’s more, the area to be “self-governed” by the separatists is much less than they had originally demanded. Legislation to authorize these arrangements has already been introduced in the Ukrainian Parliament over violent protests by the ugly, pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic groups that to date have done so much to prolong the fighting in eastern Ukraine, and which through their policy of random destruction have forced some 1 million Russian speakers to flee into Russia — ethnic cleansing with a vengeance.

Yet all Moscow gets from its very considerable concessions at Minsk and its acceptance of those refugees is a continuation of sanctions and an escalation of NATO military pressures. This, even though two senior NATO members, Germany and France, were present to endorse the Minsk agreements that are now being implemented. NATO once saw fit to bomb Belgrade to force a transfer of sovereignty to Kosovo. Moscow is condemned for much less.

Even as the Ukraine situation winds down, the anti-Moscow sanctions continue and NATO still blows hot. Maybe this is justified by the Crimea takeover. If so, I suggest the people involved should visit the Crimea.

Historically, it has always been Russian (remember the Crimean War?). It remains Russian. In two visits, one very recent, I have never heard a word of Ukrainian spoken. Crimea was gifted to Ukraine by Moscow in 1954 as an act of Soviet convenience, despite the problem of having to retain the Soviet fleet in Sevastopol. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 it should automatically have been returned to Russia. Its seizure during the 2014 troubles in Kiev was inevitable and for most, welcome.

As for that other excuse for NATO pressure — alleged aggressive Russian pressure against the three Baltic States — does anyone in NATO know about the severe language and other discrimination against the Russian-origin minorities stranded in this area by the 1991 Soviet breakup? Details provided by Moscow have been thoroughly ignored. If Moscow’s unhappiness on this account amounts to aggression then we need a new definition of aggression.

Ingrained Cold War fears and NATO expansionism explain some of the illogicality of Western anti-Russia moves. Ignorance is another factor. The people who accuse Moscow of trying to suppress the native Tartar language in Crimea need only to turn on the TV in Crimea to discover daily programs teaching Tartar. How many in NATO really understand what is going on in the Baltic States?

But Moscow also shares some of the blame. Its vigorous denials of any responsibility by the pro-Russian separatists for the March 2014 destruction of the Malaysian airliner MH17 helped early on to push Western opinion in an anti-Moscow direction. I spent some time in August in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a highly intelligent and very senior official who tried with genuine sincerity to convince me that the theories blaming Ukraine were correct. True, seeming bullet holes in the fuselage gave some credence to what she and quite a few others were saying. But Moscow now accepts a missile was responsible. It should not have wasted our time with elaborate theories and radar scans that said Ukrainian fighter planes were responsible.

By

Gregory Clark is a former Australian diplomat and president of Tama University. He recently made a fact-finding visit to Russia at the invitation of the Russian authorities. The initial report of that visit can be found at www.gregoryclark.net/jt/page126/page126.html .

Source: Japan Times

Henry Kissinger: Is nuclear catastrophe inevitable?

Henry Kissinger, who is still (to my mind) the wisest foreign policy analyst in the land, just wrote a Wall Street Journal piece called “A path out of Middle East Collapse.”

Today that article is being carefully analyzed all over the world.

Kissinger’s most crucial point: “If nuclear weapons become established (in the Middle East), a catastrophic outcome is nearly inevitable.”

Well, Obama and Europe have just handed the nuclear key to Iran, and Saudi Arabia is shopping for its own. Pakistan is selling. Are we in “inevitable catastrophe” territory yet?

Our delusional liberals have been whistling past that graveyard to protect Obama. But the next president won’t have that option. Putin just said that “some American politicians have mush for brains,” and that isn’t just braggadocio.

Dr. K starts with the disastrous collapse of the power balance in the Middle East. And because he writes in long, thought-provoking sentences, it’s worth focusing on some of his high points.

1. “With Russia in Syria, a geopolitical structure that has lasted four decades is in shambles.”

2. Four Arab states have ceased to function: Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. All are at risk of being taken over by ISIS, which aims to become a global caliphate governed under shariah law.

3. The U.S. and the West need a coherent strategy. We don’t have one now.

4. Treating Iran as a normal power is wishful thinking. It could happen over time. But today, Iran “is taking on an Armageddon dimension.”

Israel is in the maelstrom, but so is the rest of the world, which is why Russia is making an unprecedented military intervention in Syria. Putin is protecting Russia first of all.

5. “So long as ISIS survives and remains in control of a geographically defined territory, it will compound Middle East tensions… The destruction of ISIS is more urgent than the overthrow of Bashar Assad.”

6. “The US has already acquiesced in a Russian military role.” (Vladimir Putin has suggested a new Russo-Western alliance, on the World War II model.)

Given the general failure of political will in the West, combined with Putin’s strategic clarity, a practical alliance could work.

Dr. Kissinger didn’t say it, but Putin has been watching jihadist forces on his southern border come closer and closer to nuclear weapons. Putin rose to the top by fighting jihadist Chechens, in Russia’s usual merciless fashion. Today, thousands of Chechens have joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and may go back to fight in Russia and China.

Imagine thousands of suicidal fanatics on our southern border, and you get the picture as seen from Moscow.

Bottom line: To avoid the “catastrophe” of a hot nuclear arms race in the Middle East, a practical alliance of the West with Russia might save the world.
By James Lewis

Source: American Thinker

Mr. Putin’s solution

His support of Assad may end the exodus of desperate Syrians fleeing war.

Nobody, not even his missus, will mistake Vladimir Putin for a humanitarian. He doesn’t want the not-so-huddled masses from Syria, and his deployment of the Russian army to Damascus is hardly out of concern for the human suffering from a brutal four-year civil war. But he may in the long run be seen as the man who ended the mass migration of shell-shocked Syrians. While President Obama has joined other European leaders to wring his hands and view with alarm, Mr. Putin’s reinforcement of Syrian President Bashar Assad could be the difference-maker, ending the strife and enabling desperate Syrians to stay put.Mr. Putin concluded a chilly meeting with Mr. Obama over the Syrian crisis last month and immediately dispatched Russian fighter-bombers to action against the Islamic insurgents in Syria. He demonstrated determination, and not from behind, to fill the leadership vacuum that is the legacy of Mr. Obama’s refusal to act decisively in the Middle East. Mr. Putin spoke of no fictitious unacceptable “red lines.” His decisiveness will have lasting repercussions across Europe.

When the waves of refugees fled Syria, trying to get to safety in Europe, Russia stood apart from the Western powers, pointedly refusing to join any international scheme to harbor the migrants or even to lend humanitarian assistance. Mr. Putin blamed the West for inflaming regional turmoil, saying the crisis was “completely predictable.” His spokesman at the Kremlin said coldly that the cost of providing for the refugees “will fall on the countries linked to causing the catastrophic situation.”

The distance between Syria and Russia is less than a thousand miles — half the distance between Damascus and the German border. Yet the Kremlin has accepted only a handful of refugees, and only two of those have been granted asylum. The cold inhospitality is cruel, but Russia is particularly wary of taking in Muslims, having fought two wars with Muslim-majority Chechnya in the 1990s, and numerous bloody terrorist attacks from Islamists. When Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said a fortnight ago that Russians acts in Syria were “tantamount … to pouring gasoline on the fire,” he nevertheless acknowledged “that they have experience with Islamist extremism, also. Sad and bitter experience. So, I can well understand.”

If demography is destiny, Russia is on course to confront a transforming cultural clash in the coming years. If comparative birthrates hold for Russian ethnics and the Muslims, the nation could be transformed into a Muslim-majority state by mid-century. Mr. Putin is obviously reluctant to add to the coming turmoil by sheltering more Muslims from Syria.

Fleeing for their lives to a strange and unwelcoming land with little more than the clothes they wear is something everyone in the region dreads. Mr. Putin sees the suffering Syrians with the compassion of the Russian bear. It’s one of the ironies of our time that he would be the man to bring the bloodshed in Syria to an end, motivated by coldly calculated national interest. That is something beyond the ken of America’s “peace president,” as he stands aside and clucks his tongue at the Russian assumption of the role he abandoned in the Middle East.

Source: The Washington Times

Czar Putin defends the West

Well, Obama has systematically undercut our friends in the Middle East, and Vladimir Putin is picking up the pieces. Obama promised big change — only not the ones we see happening. As Obama promised the radical left, America is now drastically weakened; but oddly enough, peace hasn’t busted out all over.

So here comes the Czar of all Russias to rescue Christian civilization from a bloody nightmare in Syria and Iraq. While the United States is supplying major weapons to brutal Sunni gangs who keep committing horrific war crimes, jihadis are taking advantage of the chaos to make genocidal attacks on Arab Christians, Egyptian Copts, Orthodox Armenians, Kurds, Yazidis, and Druze. (And each other — of course.)
Every time another domino falls, this administration looks more shell-shocked. Their comforting delusions are crumbling. Today they’ve stopped even pretending to understand what’s going on.

Even Obama’s surrender to Iran’s nuclear obsessions is now failing. Today, none of the European “partners” in that miserable appeasement are still willing to sign Obama’s Diktat; not even the Iranians, who are getting everything they want without Obama. It’s a total capitulation, with sinister consequences to come soon.
The Germans have doubled their profitable trade with Tehran, while  Russia and China are making huge military and nuclear power plant sales. Seven thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guards are fighting against U.S.-sponsored jihadis in Syria, along with ten times as many Hizb’allah fighters. Iran’s strategic noose around Saudi Arabia is tightening, and the naval chokepoint of Aden is under direct military threat.

The CIA failed to predict Putin’s intervention in Syria, yet for months everybody from Israel to Saudi Arabia has been sending top-level negotiators to Moscow. It’s the only thing they could do, after we threw them to the sharks. For nations in mortal peril, it’s any port in a storm.
And yes, it’s a fair bet that all the players carried gifts for the Tsar, to make sure they would not be victimized by the new hegemon.
The CIA failed to predict the Russian move into Syria. But you don’t need a huge intelligence “community” to see the obvious. This White House isn’t interested in the truth anyway. Obama can’t stand being contradicted, and the CIA is responding by not telling him what he doesn’t want to hear.

Syria’s President Assad is as ruthless as any dictator in the Middle East, but he based his power on protecting minorities, like his own Alawites. Like Muammar Gadaffi in Libya, he kept a precarious peace among hostile factions.
Christian bishops in the Middle East see Putin as their sole protector in the double bind between jihad and a militantly atheist West. To persecuted minorities in the Middle East, Putin has seized the moral high ground.

We have no idea what Putin is going to do next. Russia has the potential of becoming a major stabilizing force in the Middle East. But his convictions are becoming clearer. He understands Syria along the lines of his war with Chechnya: His actions there were ruthless but effective. ISIS has thousands of Chechnyan jihadis, now with combat experience, and ready to assault Russia. Putin will not tolerate that, just as China won’t tolerate its own Muslim rebels in Syria-Iraq returning to attack its vulnerable Uighur flank.

Putin carries street cred in a world of jihadist gangs. In 2002, Chechnyan terrorists murdered school children in Beslan and bombed the Dubrovka Theater. Putin reacted with brutal efficiency. His rise to power since that time is based on knocking down the Chechnyan rebellion, by bombarding entire cities. Much of Putin’s popularity among regular Russians is based on his brutal suppression of violent Islam.  But the Islamists attacks still continue.
Obama has just spent half a billion dollars to arm and train “Syrian moderates,” who took the money and ran, to join the worst terrorist gangs in the neighborhood. This week we heard that 70% of our military equipment sent to “Syrian moderates” ended up in the hands of ISIS.

I know we’re not supposed to say words like “Christian civilization,” but Vladimir Putin believes them. He isn’t wrong. For four centuries, until Lenin murdered the last Romanovs in 1918, the Tsars prided themselves on being the defenders of Christianity. Like the Vatican, the Russian Orthodox Church claims a direct line of apostolic descent from the early Christian churches, by way of the Byzantine Empire. And yes, there were plenty of wars between Polish Catholics and Russian Orthodox.
There was cruel persecution of Jews whenever a scapegoat was wanted. But today the Ottoman Turks are still remembered with a special horror in Eastern and Southern Europe. Sometimes you have to choose between bad and worse.
(Several years ago Pope Benedict quoted the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Paleologus II, condemning the sadistic cruelties of jihadist Islam. Telling the truth horrified liberals around the world, the way it always does. That quote came from a time shortly before the Byzantine Empire was destroyed by jihad, leaving the remaining Orthodox Churches bereft of their original lands.)

Putin has his picture taken regularly with the Patriarch of Moscow, probably for political reasons, but also because he has a deep sense of history. Unlike every cowardly Western liberal politician who can’t say the words “Muslim barbarism,” Putin is very clear about jihad. He understands the history of horrific Muslim assaults on Russia. He knows that jihad war has not changed one little bit in a thousand years. Like Samuel Huntington, the first historian of the jihad war, Putin also understands in a very profound way that this is a war for civilization.
Vladimir Putin isn’t a nice liberal, but he is a realist, which is much more than any Western leader can say today. Without realism it is impossible to act morally. Without realism, everything turns into an Obamaesque kabuki play.
Putin was raised by an Orthodox mother and a Marxist father. He came to power by brutally putting down a Muslim terrorist rebellion in Chechnya, using the standard Russian method of bombarding entire cities until they surrendered.

As a rising KGB colonel, Putin saw his world falling apart under Gorbachev, who tried to liberalize the Soviet Empire, only to see it collapse. In his eyes, democratic liberalism doesn’t work, Soviet Marxism didn’t work, and he certainly doesn’t want nuclear jihad to win.
Americans are used to thinking of Soviet Russia as a militant atheist regime, which tried to destroy religious faith wherever it could, for seven or eight decades. One of the astonishing facts of the 20th century is the survival of traditional religion under decades of Marxist oppression. It sometimes seems as if faith tends crumble in rich consumer societies; but persecution and misery bring it back.
When the Soviet Union was beginning to crumble in the late 1980s, some members of the Central Committee were quoted as exclaiming “Bozhe moye!” — My God!! whenever another piece of bad news came in. Religion had survived, even at the secret heart of the heart of the Communist Party. The same is happening in China today.
So Putin has gone back to the Tsarist practice of using the Orthodox Church to build national unity. He is also religiously tolerant as long as it’s peaceful. As long as they don’t threaten the Tsar, people can practice their faith. (But not when it comes to militant gay movements).

If Putin is smart, he won’t abuse his new credibility and power in the Middle East. Russia stands to gain numerous benefits, as long as it is perceived to be preserving an acceptable balance of power. That also means finding a position between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between Israel and Iran, and between Europe and the oil it depends on. Russia can reap huge benefits just from protecting mutually hostile oil regimes from each other; by saving their cookies, Putin also gets into the oil game.
Putin now runs the biggest military near the world’s oil spigot, even as shale deposits are quickly being exploited all over the world.
This is a time of constant probing to discover the parameters of the new hegemony.
So far, Putin’s intervention has been cheap,  taking advantage of historically stupid moves by the Euro-American Left. Putin can use his new-found influence in the Middle East to rebuild Russia’s economy in a world of fast-falling oil prices.

Source: American Thinker

PETER HITCHENS: Which side are we really on in this war of the awful against the evil? 

I don’t think the British or American governments really want to fight the Islamic State. They just want to look as if they are doing so.

I judge these people by what they do, not by what they say. And in recent months I have noticed them doing – and not doing – some very interesting things.

The White House and Downing Street both seethe with genuine outrage about Russia’s bombing raids on Syria.

Yet the people Vladimir Putin bombed have views and aims that would get them rounded up as dangerous Islamist extremists if they turned up in Manchester. So why do British politicians call them ‘moderates’ when Russia bombs them?

It’s not as if London or Washington can claim to be squeamish about bombing as a method of war. We have done our fair share of it in Belgrade, Baghdad and Tripoli, where our bombs certainly (if unintentionally) killed innocent civilians, including small children.

Then there’s the curious case of Turkey. Rather like Russia, Turkey suddenly announced last summer that it was sending its bombers in to fight against the Islamic State.

But in fact Turkey barely bothered to attack IS at all. It has spent most of the past few months blasting the daylights out of the Kurdish militias, a policy that Turkey’s President Erdogan has selfish reasons for following.

Yet the Kurds, alongside the Syrian army, have been by far the most effective resistance to IS on the ground. Why then does a key member of the alleged anti-IS coalition go to war against them?

Turkey, a Nato member, is not criticised for this behaviour by Western politicians or by the feeble, slavish Western media. These geniuses never attack our foreign policy mistakes while we are making them. They wait until they have actually ended in disaster. Then they pretend to have been against them all along.

I’ve grown tired of people impersonating world-weary cynics by intoning the old saying ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’ as if it were a new-minted witticism.

But in this case, this sensible old rule seems to have been dropped. Instead, our enemy’s enemies – in the case of the Kurds, Syria’s government and the Russians – are mysteriously our enemies too.

Meanwhile the Turkish enemies of our Kurdish friends are somehow or other still our noble allies.

Compare our weird attitude towards Syria’s horrible but anti-IS president, Bashar Assad, to Winston Churchill’s wiser view of Stalin.

Stalin became our ally when the Nazis invaded Russia. Churchill, a lifelong foe of Soviet communism, immediately grasped that times had changed. ‘If Hitler invaded Hell,’ he said ‘I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.’

That is because, in body, heart and soul, sleeping and waking, with all the force and spirit he possessed, he was committed to the fight against Hitler above all things. So he would have accepted any ally against him.

Is this true of our leaders, who constantly portray Assad (and Putin) as Hitler, who imagine themselves as modern Churchills and condemn their critics as ‘appeasers’?

No. They play both ends against the middle. Their anti-extremist rhetoric, turned up full when confronting Birmingham schoolteachers or bearded preachers, drops to a whisper when they want to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, the home of Islamist fanaticism.

Things are not what they seem to be here. Russia’s action may be rash and dangerous. It may fail, especially as we are obviously trying so hard to undermine it. But at least it is honest and straightforward.

Read more in source Daily Mail

In Syria, whose side is the United States on?

Vladimir Putin has been able to act forcefully in Syria not because he’s bolder or more decisive than Barack Obama but because he has a clearer strategy. Putin has an ally, the Assad government. He has enemies, the opponents of the government. He supports his ally and fights those enemies. By comparison, Washington and the West are fundamentally confused.

Whom is the United States for in this struggle? We know whom it is against — the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Also, the Islamic State, which happens to be the regime’s principal opponent. Also, all the other jihadi groups fighting in Syria — including Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Qaeda affiliate) and Ahrar al-Sham. Oh, and Hezbollah forces and Iranian forces who have been supporting the Syrian government. The West is against almost every major group fighting in Syria, which makes for moral clarity but strategic incoherence.

Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and a contributing editor for The Atlantic. View Archive

Russia’s move is not as brilliant as is being made out. It is a desperate effort to shore up one of the Kremlin’s only foreign allies and risks making Russia the “Great Satan” in the eyes of jihadis everywhere. But at least Putin has a coherent plan. The United States, by contrast, is closely allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against militant Sunnis in that country. But it finds itself fighting on the same side of these militant Sunnis across the border in Syria as they battle the Assad regime.

Washington does back some groups — the Syrian Kurds close to Turkey, moderate forces supported by Jordan close to its border and a small number of other moderate Syrians. But if you consider the major groups vying for control of Damascus, the United States is against almost all of them.

Kenneth Pollack and Barbara Walter describe the administration’s basic approach, which sees all existing fighting forces as inadequate in some way. “The United States is building a new Syrian opposition army. That army is meant to be apolitical, nonsectarian, and highly integrated,” they write in the Washington Quarterly. “When it is ready, it will . . . conquer (liberate) and hold territory against both the Assad regime and the various Sunni jihadist groups. . . . The result would be an inclusive new government with extensive protections for all minority groups.” It would be one thing to have believed that this was possible 15 years ago. But after the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, this is fantasy, not foreign policy.

David Petraeus recently proposed an expanded military intervention, creating havens and potentially a no-fly zone to counter Assad’s barrel bombs. But could such a plan defeat the Islamic State? When Petraeus devised a strategy in Iraq to tackle the precursor to this group, he emphasized that “you can’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency.” His 2006 field manual on counterinsurgency says that “ultimate success” comes only by “protecting the populace.” Commanders must “transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible.”

That’s the problem. The U.S. Army could easily defeat the Islamic State, which has a lightly armed force of fewer than 30,000 men. But then it would own real estate in Syria. Who wants to govern that territory, protect the population and be seen by locals as legitimate? A senior Turkish official told me recently, “We watched you trying to run Iraqi towns, and we will not make America’s mistake.”

If one looks back over the many U.S. interventions around the globe, one factor looms large. When Washington allied with a local force that was capable and viewed as legitimate, it succeeded. But without such locals, all the outside effort, aid, firepower and training can only do so much — whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria.

If Obama’s goal is a peaceful, stable, multisectarian democracy, then it requires a vast U.S. commitment on the scale of the Iraq war. If not, Washington has to accept reality and make some hard decisions. The two big ones are whether to stop opposing Assad and whether to accept that Syria is going to be partitioned.

If defeating the Islamic State is important, then it has to become the overriding priority, allying with any outside forces that will join the fight. If Assad falls and jihadis take Damascus, that would be worse than if Assad stays. This doesn’t mean providing Assad with any support, but allowing him to create an Alawite enclave in Syria, of a kind that is already forming. The Kurds and moderate Syrians are creating their own safe spaces as well. Even if the civil war ends and a country called Syria remains, these groups will not live all intermingled again.

So far in Syria, the West has combined maximalist, uncompromising rhetoric with minimalist, ineffective efforts. It is the yawning gap between the two that is making Vladimir Putin look smart.

Source: Washington Post

Why Russia’s Syria war is bad news for the U.S. (and why it isn’t)

Russian warplanes are conducting airstrikes now in Syria, according to a slew of news reports. The move follows authorization by a vote in Russian parliament as well as weeks of Kremlin messaging about the importance of bolstering the Syrian regime to combat the Islamic State.

But it’s not clear whether the targets of the current wave of airstrikes were positions manned by the jihadists. The Russian action raises a number of strategic conundrums for the U.S., which has waged a concerted air campaign of its own in Syria and Iraq against the extremist organization.

There has been little coordination between the two sides over the airstrikes. On the sidelines of meetings at the United Nations, Secretary of State John Kerry apparently told Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov that the intervention was “not helpful.”

Here are reasons both why that — as far as Washington’s interests go — is probably true, and why it’s not.

Why it’s bad news

It helps Assad
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials have made no secret of their government’s support for the embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose regime has presided over the systematic destruction and unraveling of the Syrian state.

For the U.S. and its allies, Assad’s departure has been a prerequisite to any lasting solution to the Syrian conflict, which has entered its fifth year and claimed more than 300,000 lives. But as Western drones and military jets streaked the skies over Iraq and Syria in the past year, little has been done to actually dislodge Assad, whose forces have also been battling the Islamic State.

Moscow has wrung its hands over the dangers posed by the Islamic State, an organization that Lavrov in April deemed “the main threat” to Russia’s domestic security. Some 2,500 Russian citizens are believed to be among the jihadists’ ranks.

But Russia has framed its war effort in Syria as an action taken specifically on behalf of the government in Damascus. As WorldViews noted earlier, the Russians have a long, close relationship with the Assad family that endured and, in some regards, grew closer after the end of the Cold War.

“Russia will factually be the only country to carry out this operation on the legitimate basis of the request of the legitimate government of Syria,” said Putin spokesman Dmitri Peskov on Wednesday, gesturing to the supposed “illegality” of the U.S. air war in Syria.

A spokesman for the opposition Syrian National Council denounced the Russian airstrikes, telling The Washington Post’s Hugh Naylor that Russia, like Assad, “targeted civilians, not ISIS.”

It inflames sectarian tensions
The bigger worry is that, even if Russia does hit the Islamic State, its renewed support for the Assad regime makes an already grim, entrenched conflict even more intractable.

As the graphic above shows, Russia’s recent deployments are centered roughly around Assad’s remaining bastions in northwestern Syria, a coastal area that’s the heartland of the Alawites, the minority sect to which the Assad family belongs. The contours of the Syrian conflict have shifted since the anti-Assad uprising in 2011, and now have a tragically sectarian character.

Sunni fundamentalist and Salafist groups have warred against Russians before, and experts believe they will benefit from Moscow’s intervention. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has labeled the new campaign a “dangerous escalation” and doubled down on his country’s insistence on the removal of Assad, even with a “military option.”

The kingdom, which sees itself at the vanguard of the Arab world’s Sunni states, is believed to have directly or indirectly supported a number of Islamist and rebel factions fighting in Syria.

Those interests collide with those of Russia and Iran, a Shiite theocratic state and Saudi rival that has long propped up the Assad regime, recently with the direct backing of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy. Russia’s entrance into the conflict only deepens the region’s larger geopolitical faultlines.

It makes the U.S. look bad
To some Republicans and neo-conservatives in Washington, the current scenario highlights a worrying contrast in style and policy between President Obama and Putin. To critics of the White House, Putin’s apparent resolve and decisiveness in Syria is a consequence of supposed American fecklessness and dithering.

The Russian campaign “is a dramatic example of the diminution of . . . American influence in the region,” warned Sen. John McCain, a perennial booster of the primacy of American military might abroad and the role it ought to play.

According to The Washington Post’s editorial page, Obama has been unable to counter Putin’s recent “flurry of alliance-building in Syria, Iraq and Iran” ahead of the airstrikes and could be compelled to compromise with a strengthened Assad regime. “Shortsighted and cynical as it may be, at least Mr. Putin has a plan for Syria,” the editorial read.

Why it’s not bad news

It will make Russia look bad
The consensus among experts is that the Russian escalation is less the outcome of a concerted strategy than it is, more simply, an opportunistic gamble. The Post’s Anne Appelbaum explains what may be shaping the Kremlin’s calculus.

For Putin’s entry into Syria, like almost everything else that he does, is part of his own bid to stay in power. During the first 10 years he was president, Putin’s claim to legitimacy went, in effect, like this: I may not be a democrat, but I give you stability, a rise in economic growth and pensions paid on time. In an era of falling oil prices and economic sanctions, not to mention vast public-sector corruption, that argument no longer works… And so his new argument goes, in effect, like this: “I may not be a democrat and the economy may be sinking, but Russia is regaining its place in the world — and besides, the alternative to authoritarianism is not democracy but chaos.”

Putin’s boldness, in other words, is a fig leaf for a regime that’s already in dangerous risk of over-reach. According to a recent poll, a minority of Russians back the intervention, while a considerable majority were “opposed or strongly opposed.”

Given Moscow’s limited military capabilities, at least compared to the U.S., there’s little indication that Russia will be able to do much more to harm the Islamic State than the U.S. and its allies already have over the past year. The longer the campaign drags on, the larger the shadow of mission creep will loom.

“Great powers always look the most powerful when they announce expanded activity in a region. It’s what happens next that matters,” writes Post Everything’s Dan Drezner.

And what happens next could be rather problematic for Putin, suggests analyst Michael Cohen:

If anything, Russian involvement in Syria will almost certainly divert its attention from Eastern Europe, which is good news for NATO and potentially Ukraine. It also risks alienating the Gulf states, Turkey and other regional actors, thus, if anything, blunting Russia’s effort to extend its influence in the Middle East. In the end, Russia’s Syria misadventure stands a good chance of doing Moscow much more harm than good.

It could damage the Islamic State
And what if Russia sticks by its word, and helps deliver some significant defeats of the Islamic State? Few organizations have commanded such universal global antipathy as the jihadist group, whose terror attacks, enslavement of women and beheading of hostages have filled international front pages.

This prospect likely explains the somewhat cagey response of top Western diplomats to Wednesday’s news of the Russian airstrikes. Even if Russia focuses more on fighting other rebel factions, the potential gains for the Assad regime may be rather limited.

“The idea that Russian fighters will enable the [Assad] regime to reclaim territory is a fantasy,” writes Hassan Hassan, co-author of a recent book on the rise of the Islamic State. “Moscow will bolster the regime’s capabilities to defend itself in key towns and cities, but nothing more.”

A Russian government bogged down in Syria’s complicated mire may better appreciate the need to phase the Assad regime out through some sort of political transition. At least that’s the view of Obama administration officials who spoke to reporters of the New York Times. When asked about the Russian intervention, one official quipped: “Knock yourselves out.”

Source: Washington Post